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Teaching and Learning Islamic
Law in a Globalized World:
Some Reflections and Perspectives
Shaheen Sardar Ali
This paper is an attempt to highlight some questions and issues inherent in
the conceptualisation, development, and delivery of Islamic law curricula in
diverse jurisdictions and in an increasingly globalized academic environment.
There exist significant challenges, both conceptual and methodological, for
Islamic law teaching in Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdictions. In Muslim
jurisdictions, it is imperative to move beyond an exclusively doctrinal, literal,
and inflexible approach to teaching and learning Islamic law. To achieve this,
instructors need to consciously evaluate the content of their courses as well as
their classroom techniques. However, that approach presents somewhat of a
dilemma: On the one hand Muslim academics endorse the dynamic and varied
interpretations enriching the Islamic legal tradition by different schools of
juristic thought. On the other hand, in reality, this diversity and dynamism does
not translate to a tolerant intellectual environment in the academy and indeed
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in life in general. In this article, I draw upon my own experiences teaching
and researching Islamic law in both Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdictions,
as well as on the views and opinions of Islamic law teachers in a number of
jurisdictions, including Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, Continental Europe, and the United States. This paper has grown
organically over a number of years through feedback and comments from
students, colleagues, and participants at various workshops and conferences as
part of an Islamic Law Curriculum Development Project. I suggest adopting
a “law in context” approach to appreciate the inherent complexities and
intricacies of Islamic law. I argue for adopting a rigorous methodology in the
teaching and learning process by encouraging a critical engagement with the
primary and secondary sources of the Islamic legal tradition. Simultaneously,
this paper emphasizes how Islamic law teaching is “different” or “special”
compared to subjects where “the law” consists of clearly defined articles of
statute law. Finally, this paper advances the argument that teaching Islamic
law offers the opportunity for imparting important lawyering skills, including
developing coherent arguments from varying source materials, understanding
the plurality of views and opinions, analyzing legal norms, and sifting and
extrapolating the legal from the moral, ethical and religious injunctions. A
common theme running through this paper is the consciousness that law
making based on a divine text (as is the case in Islamic law), is a human and
not divine act and therefore open to challenge, debate and change. Contested
and controversial as this approach is, it must form an integral component of
any course on Islamic law.
Having taught various aspects of Islamic law for twenty-five years in a
Muslim jurisdiction, I encountered some interesting challenges when I stepped
out of my sheltered niche of Peshawar University in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa
Province1 of Pakistan and into international academic settings. Devising guest
lectures, short courses, conferences and workshops, and undergraduate and
postgraduate modules at a number of institutions outside the country of my
birth put me on a steep learning and discovery curve. I found myself in turn
surprised, challenged, fascinated, and enthused by significant differences
underlying the conceptual, methodological, and pedagogical approaches
employed in a university located in a country with a predominantly Muslim
population and institutions in non-Muslim countries including the United
Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, and the United States.
Like every discipline, Islamic law raises conceptual, methodological and
pedagogical issues in terms of its teaching and learning processes. This paper
seeks to identify and analyze some of these, with the proviso that issues raised
here are not exhaustive but merely indicative of questions one may anticipate
in the teaching and learning of Islamic law.
1.

This province formerly known as the NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP) was renamed as Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa through the recently enacted Eighteenth Constitutional
Amendment adopted by the Pakistan Parliament in 2010.
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The Islamic Legal Tradition: Key Concepts and Terminology
One of the core concepts in the study of Islamic law is the Shari’a,2 both in
terms of its centrality to the understanding of the Islamic legal tradition as well
as the varying definitions ascribed to it. Shari’a is the overarching umbrella of
rules, regulations, values, and normative framework covering all aspects and
spheres of life for Muslims. It constitutes the divine injunctions of God (the
Qur’an), divinely-inspired Sunna (words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad
recorded as Hadith) as well as the human articulation and understanding of
these sources.3 Shari’a is therefore not restricted to legal rules; it is informed
by the divine and divinely inspired text, but not entirely so, and not static and
immutable but dynamic and evolutionary in nature.
Rahman states that:
At the very root of the Muslim conception of law lies the idea that law is
inherently and essentially religious. That is why, from the beginning of Islamic
history, law has been regarded as flowing from or being part of the concept of
Shari’a (the divinely ordained pattern of human conduct).4

Kamali too reiterates the divine and religious nature of Shari’a declaring
that:
Notwithstanding the fact that human reason has always played an important
role in the development of Shariah...the Shariah itself is primarily founded on
divine revelations.5

An-Naim is of the view that:
The term Shari’a refers to the general normative system of Islam as historically
understood and developed by Muslim jurists, especially during the first three
centuries of Islam—the eighth to tenth centuries CE. In this commonly used
sense, Shari’a includes a much broader set of principles and norms than legal
subject matter as such.6

2.

Readers will note that the term Shari’a is spelled differently by different authors (Shariah,
Sharia’t). Unless quoting an author who may have spelled the word differently, this paper
will use Shari’a as the standard spelling.

3.

See Abdur Rahim, Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Mansoor Book House 1995); Mohammad
Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (3d ed. Islamic Texts Society 2003);
Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (The Islamic Foundation 1999); A. R. I. Doi,
Shari’ah: The Islamic Law (Ta Ha Pub. 1984); Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan
Law (4th ed. Oxford Univ. Press 1974).

4.

Fazlur Rahman, Islam (3d ed. Univ. of Chicago Press 1979).

5.

Kamali, supra note 3, at xix.

6.

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim (ed.), Islamic Family Law in a Changing World: A Global
Resource Book 1–2 (Zed Press 2002).
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Shari’a thus is more than black letter law and legal principles. It encompasses
social, moral and ethical normativities affecting human lives.7 I suggest
elsewhere that the phrase “principles of Islamic law” more appropriately
captures the true breadth of this concept, as opposed to terming it immutable,
unchangeable, and divine law, whereas the legal component of Shari’a is the
“Islamic legal tradition” or “Islamic law” as it is commonly termed.8
The Islamic legal tradition includes primary sources such as the Qur’an9 and
Sunna,10 and secondary sources, including Ijma (consensus of opinion)11 and
Qiyas (analogical deduction).12 In addition, the range of juristic techniques
includes Ijtihad (literally, striving hard and strenuously), which denotes
exercising independent juristic reasoning to provide answers when the Qur’an
and Sunna are silent on a particular issue.13 Taqlid (duty to follow) is considered
by most students of Islamic law as mere “imitation,” to emulate or copy. As a
term of jurisprudence, taqlid may be used in the context of accepting someone’s
intellectual authority.14 While inhibiting independent legal formulations,
taqlid allowed later jurists a choice from among variant views recorded in
authoritative texts.15
7.

Id. at 68; A. Allot, The Limits of Law (Butterworths 1980); Fyzee, supra note 4; David Pearl
& W. Menski, Muslim Family Law (3d ed. Sweet & Maxwell 1998).

8.

I have developed the idea of the “operative” Islamic law as opposed to Shari’a in my book:
Shaheen Sardar Ali, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law: Equal
Before Allah, Unequal Before Man? (Kluwer Law Int’l. 2000).

9.

The Qur’an is believed by Muslims to be the word of God and was revealed to the Prophet
Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel over a period of 22 years, 2 months and 22 days. It
is divided into 114 chapters and has a total of 6,666 verses and 30 sections.

10.

Sunna, meaning the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (and also known as
traditions), are compiled as Hadith (singular) and Ahadith (plural). A tradition or Hadith is
composed of the matn (text) of the tradition and the isnad (chain of transmitters).

11.

It is defined by Rahim as “agreement among the Muslim jurists in a particular age on a
question of law.” Rahim, supra note 3, at 97. “Ijma is defined as the unanimous agreement of
the mujtahidun of the Muslim community of any period following the demise of the Prophet
Muhammad on any matter.” Kamali, supra note 3, at 230.

12.

As a source of law Qiyas comes into operation in matters not covered by an express text of the
Qur’an and Sunna nor dealt with by Ijma. The law deduced by application of what has already
been laid down by the three sources is Qiyas. Rahim, supra note 3, at 117.

13.

A person qualified to undertake Ijtihad is known as a Mujtahid and there are specific
qualifications for a person to be so acknowledged.

14.

Rahim, supra note 3, at 144–145; Noel James Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 80–81
(Edinburgh Univ. Press 1994).

15.

Coulson, supra note 14, at 182.
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Similarly, by applying the process or technique of ikhtilaf, or the “unity
in diversity” doctrine, jurists of the various schools of thought as well
as practitioners arrived at positions that were representative of diverse
viewpoints.16
Takhayyur means a process of selection and is a term of jurisprudence used to
consider possible alternatives from a range of juristic opinions on a particular
point of law, with the intention to apply the least restrictive legal principles
to issues arising. Takhayyur has been of enormous significance in developing a
number of women friendly codes of family laws in Muslim jurisdictions.17
Talfiq, translated literally as “patchwork,” implies the process whereby
Muslim jurists constructed legal rules by the combination and fusion of
opinions derived from different schools of thought on a particular issue.18
Maslaha (the public good or in the public interest) or masalihu’l-mursala
wa’listislah is a doctrine propounded by Imam Malik who allowed “a deduction
of law to be based on general considerations of the public good.”19 There
is evidence that qadis (judges) and jurists in Muslim history have employed
this concept to override problems arising out of adherence to strict doctrine
enshrined in the classical legal texts. Darura (necessity/duress) is a technique
applied where it becomes imperative to make prohibited things and situations
permissible. Last but certainly not least in the catalogue of juristic techniques
is custom or ‘urf as a source of law, also termed ta’amul or ‘adat.20
16.

Id. at 86. This diversity is described by Coulson as being “as varied as the colors of the
rainbow.”

17.

For example, regarding circumstances where a married Muslim woman may seek dissolution
of her marriage, the Hanafi School is restrictive whereas the Maliki is flexible and allows a
wife to seek dissolution on the grounds of her husband’s cruelty. This was incorporated in
a number of personal status laws in the Muslim world. Likewise, the Hanbali doctrine of
abiding by stipulations (based on the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad) led this school of
thought to declare that the marriage contract could stipulate the husband’s monogamy,
the wife could choose the place of residence, and so on. Examples of Takhayyur include the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939, the Moroccan Code of Personal Status 1858,
Jordanian Law of Family Rights 1951, Syrian Law of Personal Rights 1953, the Ottoman Law
of Family Rights 1917, and the latest, Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana) 2004, among
others.

18.

An interesting example of talfiq is the Indian landmark case of Muhammad Ibrahim v.
Gulam Ahmed (1864), where a girl brought up as a Shafi’i married without her father’s
consent. When the case came up in court, she declared that she had chosen to change her
school of juristic thought to the Hanafi School because Hanafi law allows an adult Muslim
woman to marry without the consent of her guardian.

19.

Rahim, supra note 3, at 140; see also Coulson, supra note 14, at 144.

20.

At times controversial, this source of law and juristic technique plays an important role
in the growth of the Islamic legal tradition as it speaks to the commonly held beliefs and
convictions of communities. Thus some communities of South Asia relied upon ‘urf to
interpret Muslim laws of inheritance.
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Students of Islamic law are also called upon to appreciate the difference
between Shari’a, fiqh, and usul-ul-fiqh. According to Kamali:
The main difference between fiqh and usul-ul-fiqh is that the former is concerned
with the knowledge of the detailed rules of Islamic law in its various branches,
and the latter with the methods that are applied in the deduction of such rules
from their sources. Fiqh, in other words, is the law itself, whereas usul-ul-fiqh is
the methodology of the law.21

The Definitional/Naming Dilemmas
Bearing in mind the vast array of terms and terminology employed in
describing the Islamic legal tradition and its various branches, as well as the
limitations of translating these from Arabic to English, one of the first issues
to grapple with in constructing a course on the Islamic legal tradition relates
to appropriate title and terminology. Do we describe it as Shari’a law, Muslim
law, Islamic law, or Muhammadan law (recalling the colonial description)?
Each of these course titles has implications for scholarship on the subject as
well as content, pedagogy and delivery of the curriculum because the title
also delineates its ideological underpinnings. A course entitled Shari’a Law for
instance implies that Shari’a constitutes law in the sense of legally enforceable
rules and akin to black letter law. But as we have noted above, law is only a
component of Shari’a, which covers all aspects of human life, and such a course
title would be misleading. Secondly, and more importantly, Shari’a law reflects
the position that it is an all-encompassing normative framework of divine
rules and hence immutable and unchangeable through human intellectual
endeavour. This approach, of assuming Shari’a to comprise solely divine and
unchangeable rules, though not necessarily inherent in the title, is prominent
in Islamic law teaching in Muslim jurisdictions. In non-Muslim jurisdictions,
however, the extent to which a course with this title and content fits within
a law curriculum and, whether a better fit might be a program based in a
department of theology, religious studies, or Islamic studies, becomes an open
question.
Muslim law, on the other hand, is a title that refers to those aspects of the law
that are understood by Muslims to be Islamic law. But this understanding is
not and cannot be uniform as Islamic law does not have a static, fixed content,
since it is extrapolated from a range of sources by different juristic schools of
thought in Islam. Broadly, these schools or madhab (plural madahab) as they are
called, are Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali (among Sunni Muslims), and
Athna-Ashariya, Zaidya and Ismailia schools among Shia Muslims. Implicitly,
the term reflects interpretative variations within the Islamic legal tradition as
well as contemporary law reform in the Muslim world. For instance Hanafi
Muslims do not require an adult Muslim woman to have the consent of her
male guardian to enter into a valid contract of marriage whereas followers
of the Maliki tradition present it as a legal requirement. Similarly, legal
21.

Kamali, supra note 3, at 2.
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practice in Muslim communities concerning what they believe to be “Islamic”
also varies. An example is the practice (among predominantly South Asian
Muslims) of divorce by a husband through three pronouncements without any
space for reconciliation (commonly known as “triple talaq”). Such practice is
not considered Islamically legal by Shia Muslims. Despite this more realistic
description of the Islamic legal tradition, few courses on the subject have
adopted the title, Muslim law.22
Finally, we come to Islamic law—the most widely used title for courses on
the subject in Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdictions. Such a title describes a
course based on the substance and methodology derived from the primary and
secondary sources, the general teachings of Islam, the Shari’a as principles of
legally enforceable law, and contemporary legislation of Muslim jurisdictions
derived thereof. Defined in these terms, Islamic law encompasses not only
the theoretical framework of Islamic law, but also the various interpretations
of these sources as well as legislative enactments. A course titled Islamic Law
invites some criticism on the basis that the title creates the expectation of a
uniform body of regulatory norms in statutory formulation, a position few
scholars on the subject would be willing to support. Islamic Law must combine
jurisprudence (fiqh and usul-ul-fiqh) and law as one leads to the other. Secondly,
and more importantly, the law in Islamic Law should not be understood as the
authoritative voice of black letter law conceptualised in western legal systems,
and which the course title appears to denote.
In response to these observations, it is fair to note that courses based on the
Islamic legal tradition invariably tend to include an element of contemporary
legislation in Muslim jurisdictions based upon the Qur’an, Hadith as well as
secondary and subsidiary sources of Islamic law. These courses thus present a
combination of jurisprudence as well as its application and are not so far off
the mark in the choice of title. The present paper uses Islamic law to define
and describe scholarship derived from and based on principles of the Islamic
legal tradition. I consciously use the term in order to include codification of
these principles in contemporary Muslim jurisdictions.23
22.

It is not within the scope of the present paper to interrogate why “Muslim law” does not find
currency as a possible title, and it would require specific research to answer this question. I
do believe that it is worth devoting time and thought to such an inquiry and an empirical
study from a cross section of respondents across Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdictions may
highlight some interesting responses. I raise this also as a pedagogical and methodological
matter for teachers and students of the Islamic legal tradition.

23.

My own module on the subject is entitled An Introduction to Islamic Law, arrived at after
much thought and discussion with colleagues.
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Teaching Context and Methodology
For purposes of faculty in law schools, the critical question underpinning
a course on Islamic law is: Does the fact that the sources of Islamic law are
believed to be of divine origin affect the way the law should be taught?24 If so,
how might one approach the subject? Students often confuse the teaching of
Islam as a religious doctrine with Islamic law, i.e., the principles and body of
legal rules based upon it. Islamic doctrine and Islamic law are indeed different
and this difference needs to be considered pedagogically. What is the impact
of this difference on teaching and learning processes within the discipline?
For instance, if we are to teach the subject as part of a religious studies
curriculum, both content and delivery is likely to cover the origins, history
and evolution of Islam and Muslims, with less emphasis on the law-making
process in the Islamic legal tradition. On the other hand, when located in
law and social sciences (the focus of the present paper), instructors must use
divine, and divinely inspired sources, i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith, as sources of a
legal tradition hence opening them to critical engagement and analysis. Most
English language scholarship on Islamic law devotes less space and discussion
to usul-ul-fiqh and more to the history of Islamic law. Faculty using these as
textbooks reflect similar trends and approaches. It is suggested that course
content on Islamic law include methodology (usul) for deriving concrete and
relevant legal doctrines from the religious sources.
As a result, Islamic law teachers must always decide whether the course will
be taught from a faith-based or a critical perspective. Ought we to adopt a
different approach to teaching Islamic law on the basis that some of its sources
are believed by Muslims to be the word of God from which no deviation is
permitted? How far can the teaching and learning process in Islamic law
critique these sources without breaking the boundaries of respect for religious
text considered sacred and beyond debate by its adherents? Personally, I try to
clarify these issues in the introductory session and make it clear that while in
practice there is likely to be an overlap between what constitutes Islam, Shari’a,
and Islamic law, my brief is to teach Islamic law.
Early in my experience teaching in non-Muslim jurisdictions, I learned to
make very clear from the outset that this was an academic course on legal
formulations inspired by the religion Islam as understood and developed by
Muslim jurists and scholars over the centuries. It certainly has its particularities
in that there is an inherent plurality within its jurisprudence lending itself
to a variety of interpretations of the sources; hence the lack of uniformity
of outcome in the form of laws derived thereof. But plurality within legal
traditions is not confined to Islamic law, and the common law and civil law
traditions also have multiple strains within their fabrics. I clarify the fact that I
am not teaching a course on Islam as a religion, but I also acknowledge that no
subject is taught in an ideological, social, or political vacuum. Thus teaching
and learning Islamic law, like any other subject, is a political act and never
24.

I acknowledge Prof. Cammack’s assistance in sharpening the formulation of the questions
posed.
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devoid of moral, ethical, social and political context. I am of course stating the
obvious but herein lies the difficulty of teaching a subject which draws upon
what followers of Islam believe to be the word of God, divine and immutable
and beyond reproach or question.
A further factor informing the instructor’s approach and the students’
expectations is where such a course or courses are housed. A cursory survey of
existing courses on Islamic law in Muslim and non-Muslim western settings
displays an uneven pattern. Courses offered in religious studies, theology or
Islamic studies departments, and more likely to have Islamic Studies as a title,
will be informed by the ethos and perspective of that discipline, and will have
as their primary content the study of Islam as a religious tradition.
A minority of courses on Islamic law, located in social science or law faculties,
engage with the subject from a legal and/or socio-legal perspective, drawing
upon primary and secondary sources as well as contemporary state practice.
Such courses tend to present a combination of doctrine and application,
highlighting theory and practice within the Islamic legal tradition as well
as efforts at law reform in Muslim jurisdictions.25 Experiences informing the
present paper are based upon courses housed in law schools in universities
rather than institutions of Islamic studies and/or religious studies institutes
imparting traditional Islamic education (in Muslim and non-Muslim settings).
Teaching Islamic Law in Diverse Settings
Teaching Islamic law in a Muslim jurisdiction requires a different approach
and methodology than one is able to adopt in non-Muslim jurisdictions. My
teaching career in Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim country,26 conditioned
me to adopt a descriptive approach when teaching Islamic law and to refrain
25.

In the United Kingdom, SOAS has one of the most established offerings on Islamic law.
At the undergraduate level, it offers some Islamic law courses as part of the LLB honours
program as well as BA programs. At the postgraduate level, an MA in Islamic law is
planned. For details visit http://www.soas.ac.uk/programmes/prog14037.php. At Warwick
University, a successful undergraduate module on Islamic law and postgraduate levels has
been offered for a number of years and is one of the few offered outside the London colleges.
For details, see http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/ug/store/modules/islamic_law.
Other universities including University of East London (http://www.uel.ac.uk/law/
programs/undergraduate/LLBlaw.htm) offer an Introduction to Islamic Law as part of the
LLB honors program and offer a range of courses including Islam and Human Rights,
Islamic Legal Cultures and Islamic Legal Theories as part of the postgraduate curriculum.
Hull University too, offers modules on Islamic Law at the LLB level. For details, visit http://
www.courses.hull.ac.uk/modules/0708S2/22148.html and http://www.courses.hull.ac.uk/
modules/0809S2/22163.html. The Law School at Exeter University offers Islamic Law and
Society as part of its offerings in the postgraduate program. For details, visit http://www.
huss.ex.ac.uk/postgrad/module_template.php?ModID=ARAM151&ayrc=2007/8. This is
not an exhaustive list but rather examples of the offerings on Islamic law in some United
Kingdom universities. For details of courses on Islamic law in American law schools, see
John Makdisi, A Survey of AALS Law Schools Teaching Islamic Law 55 J. Legal Educ.
583–585 (2005).

26.

I taught at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan for twenty-five years.
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from critiquing existing scholarship and textbooks. That is how I recollect
being taught in the mid-1970s as a law student at the University of Peshawar,
and that was my expectation as a student. Critical engagement, analysis, and
discussion were simply beyond the pale unless one wanted to stir up trouble
or acquire the label of infidel. Textbooks on Islamic law authored by highly
reputable scholars (including D. F. Mulla27 and Abdur Rahim28) contain critical
analysis on various aspects of Islamic law. Yet academics, including myself,
navigated around points of contention between various schools of thought in
order to avoid the need for independent thinking and critique.29 Of the three
questions for analysis, the what, why, and how, lecturers would stop at what
(descriptive/informative level of understanding concepts), and not venture
further to interrogate why and how a certain principle of law was derived. This
approach encouraged rote learning to the exclusion of questioning, debating,
and arriving at an autonomous position.30 Criticism was considered an effort
to undermine Islam itself and was a risky undertaking fraught with danger of
the gravest kind, including being accused of blasphemy.
A more compelling reason for not engaging rigorously with source materials
in Muslim jurisdictions is an underlying tension between the scholarly and
interpretative authority of the traditional Muslim scholar and a legal academic
in a law school.31 Legal academics in western style universities are rarely accepted
as interpretative authorities of the Islamic legal tradition due to their real or
perceived lack of knowledge of Arabic and classical Islamic jurisprudence (usulul-fiqh). The general public perception of faculty in public sector law schools
27.

D. F. Mulla’s Principles of Muhammadan Law (M. A. Mannan, ed., PLD Publishers 1995).

28.

Rahim, supra note 3.

29.

I periodically rebelled but was restrained under the able guidance of my senior professors
who always had my best interests at heart. One incident remains in my memory after more
than three decades: I was disturbed by gaps in historical and jurisprudential accounts of
factors leading to establishment of the Sunni and Shia sects in Islam and the resultant
diverging views on legal principles and law. My research led me to believe that this was
a political rather than a religious/spiritual schism and asked why certain landmark events
including the case of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad demanding her
inheritance from the first caliph Abu Bakr, had been blocked from Sunni Muslim memory.
My senior colleagues saved me from stirring up inter-sect violence and advised me to turn
my attention to something less controversial. Another time I posed the question of how two
persons involved in unlawful sexual relations could marry each other when their punishment
was stoning to death? Or, how could mahr (dower) be described as a gift and mark of respect
to the wife by the husband at the time of marriage when it was returnable if the wife sought
release from the marital tie?

30.

Lectures were the main method of teaching and case law was rarely referred to. What I
found deeply disturbing however, were textbooks on criminal law, including the Pakistan
Penal Code and the Hudood laws, supposedly based upon principles of the Islamic legal
tradition. The commentary and tone of the commentator/author was anything but gender
sensitive.

31.

The exception to this would be an Islamic law teacher at an Islamic university or Shari’a
faculty.
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in Muslim jurisdictions is that they are lawyers not faqih (jurist); neither are
they mufti (a person qualified to give fatwa or opinion). This perception may
also be due to the fact that the colonial era “secularised” the legal academy by
creating law schools within universities where a law degree was a prerequisite
to entering the legal profession.32 Islamic law and jurisprudence was treated as
one of many other courses and little attention was paid to developing research
and methodological skills in this field. Concurrently this led to an undermining
of the traditional institution of Islamic legal scholarship, the madrassa. A legal
academic in most Muslim jurisdictions is thus restricted to lecturing from
textbooks. Historically, the process whereby colonizers, occupying Muslim
lands, replaced native laws (including Islamic law) with European ones is a
well-documented, complex narrative. Ebrahim Moosa, for instance, recounts
encounters between colonial and Islamic law.33 Similarly, the legal historian
John Strawson presents incisive commentaries on how renowned western
Islamic law scholars contributed to undermining Islamic law as part of the
“civilizing” mission of colonizers.34
These experiences are shared by Ayesha Shahid and Mamman Lawan, my
colleagues at Warwick University. Narrating experiences of his time as a law
lecturer in Nigeria, Lawan35 stated that:
In Nigerian universities, the literature used is basically translations of the
Qur’an and Hadith (teachings) of Prophet Mohammed, textbooks and articles
mostly written by Arab, Asian or Nigerian Muslims a common feature of
which is that they represent the classical point of view. They are descriptive.
They give you the law as it is; they tell you that it has been made for you to
obey; and they warn you that obedience is in your own interest both in this life
and the life hereafter. In other words, teaching is based on the Islamic view
of adherence to law as a form of worship rewarded in life after death. The law
is regarded as either directly divine (when sourced from the Qur’an or Hadith)
or it derives its authority from the divine sources (when formulated through
secondary sources such as the views of Muslim jurists) and therefore must
32.

Fazlur Rahman, supra note 4; Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an
Intellectual Tradition (Univ. of Chicago Press 1982); see also Ebrahim Moosa, Colonialism
and Islamic Law, in Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates 158–81 (Muhammad
Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore & Martin van Bruinessen, eds., Edinburgh Univ. Press
2009).

33.

Moosa, supra note 32, at 158.

34.

John Strawson, Encountering Islamic Law (Univ. of East London School of Law
Publications, Media and Exhibition No. 1 1993), available at http://www.uel.ac.uk/law/
research/publications/islamiclaw.htm; John Strawson, Islamic Law and English Texts, 6
Law and Critique 21–38 (1995).

35.

Dr. Mamman Lawan completed his doctoral studies at the Law School, University of
Warwick in 2009. He has taught Islamic law at Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria for a
number of years.

Teaching and Learning Islamic Law in a Globalized World

217

be obeyed as it is. It is simply a take-it-or-leave-it rule. Take two examples:
Students are taught that theft attracts amputation of the arm as punishment
once the conditions (such as custody and value) have been satisfied. Likewise,
that men and women are equal save that due to the difference in their gender
roles which is informed by their respective natures, men shall take twice the
share of women in inheritance.36

In comparison, Mamman sums up his experience of teaching Islamic law in
the United Kingdom as follows:
In the UK, the (Islamic law) literature takes a different approach. It looks
at the classical position in a wider context. It questions the applicability of
Islamic public law in modern times particularly in the face of international
human rights treaties which Muslim countries clamouring for the law are
party to. It says for instance that amputation of the arm and other capital
punishments are incompatible with “universal” human rights standards. And
they describe as “discriminatory” against women the unequal inheritance
shares, something which the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) frowns at.
On a deeper level, you find further differences. In Nigerian universities for
instance, the authority of the Qur’an and Hadith are unquestionable. In class,
we boldly tell students that “the Holy Qur’an is the word of God, and the Hadith
are the sayings, actions and approvals of the Prophet.” But in the UK, the
practice is to say “the Koran is believed by Muslims to be the word of God, and
Hadith is the sayings, actions and approvals credited to Mohammed.” I even
came across literature which challenges the Hadith. For instance, a German
scholar, Ignaz Goldziher, argues that the Hadith is not a reliable source of
law because, according to him, it is the record of the views of early Muslims
and not the teachings of the Prophet or even his companions; it is oral; later
collections are larger than earlier ones; etc.37 In Nigeria, such literature cannot
find its way into school curriculum.
It is not only the literature that is challenging. The students, some of whom are
atheists or agnostics, asked questions on fundamental theological/legal issues
which would hardly be asked in Nigeria. For instance, a student once asked
me, “Does your God know the past, the present and the future?” to which,
being Muslim, I replied, “Yes, He certainly does.” The student asked further:
“Then why did He not provide for issues like human cloning in the Koran?”
Notwithstanding the fact that the Qur’an was revealed more than 1,400 years
ago and that human cloning is a new technology yet to come to fruition, this
question could only be asked in western countries like the UK; to raise the
same question in a country like Nigeria, is to challenge the wisdom of God.
36.

Mamman Lawan, Contrasting Two Teaching Experiences, Brief Contributed to the Islamic
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Ayesha Shahid38 describes the approach she had to adopt when lecturing on
Islamic law at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan and how it differed from
her experience of teaching the subject in the United Kingdom.
As part of the teaching team for the Islamic family law module, what I
have enjoyed most is the academic freedom in designing and teaching the
curriculum…. If I compare the teaching method followed at Warwick with
the method of teaching Islamic law in Pakistan I would say that there is a huge
difference between the two (not so much in terms of contents or major topics)
and definitely in terms of approach and teaching methodology. The course in
Pakistan does not invoke a critical evaluation of the subject. Any questioning
of the subject amounts to challenging religious law which is unacceptable to
conservative Muslims. As a result the course fails to generate an analytical
approach among students and lack of critique and analysis is clearly visible in
lectures delivered.39

I too can report that teaching Islamic law in non-Muslim jurisdictions has
been a more challenging, intellectually engaging and rewarding experience.
Students, mindful of the fact that this law is informed by Islam, formulate
critical questions in a respectful and mature fashion—something that a student
in a Muslim jurisdiction would never contemplate. The curriculum as well as
the teaching methods reflect this approach resulting in a fruitful intellectual
exchange.
From a pedagogical perspective, I often adopt a comparative law approach
when dealing with some issues in my Islamic law teaching. This arises due to
the different normative frameworks on which the Islamic legal tradition and
western legal systems are based. An important point is to give equal weight and
emphasis to both. One of the most challenging and eye-opening comments I
received in my feedback on the Islamic Law course at Warwick University, was
the following:
The module was very interesting and I enjoyed the subject matter…. My
key concern was that we weren’t challenged to view the law from an Islamic
viewpoint. Instead, we were seeing it from the western eye, which made it
seem antiquated or even wrong.

This comment stunned me because I had never considered either the
content or the delivery to reflect these views, but the student’s comment rang
alarm bells. On closer inspection, I realized that unconsciously, as western
academics, we tend to use a western knowledge system, both in substance
38.
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39.

Ayesha Shahid, Islamic Law Teaching, Brief contributed to the Islamic Law Curriculum
Development Project (May 2008). I am grateful for the contribution.

Teaching and Learning Islamic Law in a Globalized World

219

and procedure, as our reference point when teaching Islamic law. Thus, when
engaging with concepts and institutions of family law, for instance, we consider
monogamous marriage as the standard form while polygamous unions are
considered freakish or immoral. The starting point in many textbooks as well
as teaching sessions is the oft-repeated definition of marriage in Hyde v. Hyde,
where marriage is stated to be the union of one man and one woman to the
exclusion of all others. Islamic family law students from western jurisdictions
therefore approach and judge polygamy from their moral, ethical standpoint
and find it difficult to engage with discussion around the Qur’anic verses on the
subject.
Consciously or unconsciously, we find ourselves trapped in an Orientalist
discourse on Islamic law, its origins, and doctrine, wherein lies a constant
positioning of legal norms vis-à-vis each other.40 At best, in our conversations
with students, we are trying to present Islamic laws as modern and progressive
and not pre-modern and backward; hence the remark of my undergraduate
tutee who picked up on this defensive comparative approach, discarding it as
completely uncalled for.
In order to create a mutually beneficial discourse, one must consider the
extent to which western scholarship has engaged with Muslim scholarship.
Barring a few exceptions, knowledge of Muslim theorists, jurists and
philosophers is rare in the western world. In the few cases where there has
been an engagement with Islamic legal tradition, it has been through the
eyes of a post enlightenment western liberal tradition as well as an Orientalist
standpoint. For example, Hadith as a source of law has been of interest to western
scholars of Islamic law for over 200 years. Siddiqi states that “[w]hile some
have accepted the traditional canons of Hadith criticism developed by Muslim
scholars themselves, others have offered alternative accounts of the subject.”
Ignaz Goldziher, Alfred Guillame, Joseph Schacht and others attempt to
discredit Hadith literature as a valid source of Islamic law by questioning its
very foundation.41 Dialogue between a comparative perspective of Islamic
law and its western counterpart must be among equals. However, this type
of meaningful discourse has been conspicuously absent.42 As Edward Said
remarks: “The essence of this tradition is to subject Islamic law to European
40.

For an incisive analysis, see Wael B. Hallaq, The Quest for Origins or Doctrine? Islamic
Legal Studies as Colonialist Discourse, 2 UCLA J. Islamic & Near East Law 1 (2002).

41.

Mohammad Z. Siddiqi, Hadith Literature: Its Origins, Development and Special Features
124 (Islamic Texts Society 1993). For a concise summary of these authors’ viewpoints, see id.
at Appendix II, 124–35.

42.

Shaheen Sardar Ali, Religious Pluralism, Human Rights and Muslim Citizenship in Europe:
Some Preliminary Reflections on an Evolving Methodology for Consensus in Religious
Pluralism and Human Rights in Europe 57–59, 61 (Titia Leonon & Jenny E Goldschmidt
eds., Intersentia 2007).

220

Journal of Legal Education

intellectual judgement, by seizing the ‘superior location’ made available by
European power.”43
Some suggested steps in teaching Islamic law include the following:
• First, clarify the difference between Islam (as a religion and faith), and
Islamic law as a human articulation and endeavour, albeit informed
by the Islamic religion. I adopt a “law in context” approach for which
Warwick University Law School has always been well known in UK
academia and beyond.44 Since every verse of the Qur’an and every Hadith
has a historical context, it is important to appreciate the context in
order to understand, critique, and interrogate the law based on these
sources. Further, while Muslims consider every word of the Qur’an as the
word of God, the same cannot be said of every word of every Hadith or
indeed the secondary sources of law, i.e., ijma amd qiyas (or other juristic
techniques including ijtihad, taqlid, talfiq, and takhayyur). Therefore,
reading a primary source and a secondary source of Islamic law in their
respective contexts is integral to its understanding of how a particular
point of law was derived. I also make the point that there is no single
monolithic version of what constitutes “true” Islamic law. There are
many diverse interpretations. Equal legitimacy and acceptance must be
accorded to the various sects (Sunni and Shia) as well as schools of
juristic thought in Islam (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali).
• As an application of the above principle, I use Qur’anic verses as the
starting point for our discussion on a range of themes (e.g., marriage,
dower, divorce, custody, guardianship, inheritance, succession). We
then look at various codified laws in contemporary Muslim jurisdictions
supposedly based on these verses of the Qur’an.
• Because the woman question is so central in any discussion on Islam
and Islamic law, it is important to consciously adopt a gender-sensitive
perspective throughout the course and in analyzing how various laws
came about in the Islamic legal tradition.
• Assessments are also based on the methodology above. For instance,
in a critique of laws on dissolution of marriage, Qur’anic verses are the
starting point of our discussion. We then formulate possible drafts of
legislation based on the Qur’anic verses and analyze existing legislation
from various Muslim jurisdictions questioning the extent to which
these match the Qur’anic verses on the subject.45
43.
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We also explore the extent to which a principle of law is actually a
religious injunction and the degree to which it is derived from culture,
custom, and tradition of a given social context.
Finally, a section of the course is devoted to exploring contemporary
issues in Islamic law arising from technological and social developments
affecting Muslims in a global environment. These themes and topics
differ from year to year and include surrogacy and its implications and
responses from within the Islamic legal tradition; presenting DNA
evidence of parentage in a court of law; human milk banks and impact
on rules of prohibited degrees of relationship in marriage among
Muslims; minimum and maximum periods of gestation in order to
establish paternity (and legitimacy).

Why a “Law in Context” and Comparative Approach?
It is necessary for Islamic Law teaching to adopt a “law in context”
approach where the meaning of law is understood and explored in its wider
social, economic, political, ethical and moral sense and not confined to a
reading of the text as a formal, written piece of legislation. Additionally, and
more importantly, any question on Islamic law is open to more than one legal
response and, barring a few exceptions, more than one set of laws may well
be extrapolated from the same sources. The success of any course on Islamic
law depends on a number of front-loaded inputs. For instance, the opening
teaching sessions would be well spent on a concise overview of sources of the
Islamic legal tradition against the backdrop of the Sunni-Shia schism and the
evolution of the schools of juristic thought i.e., Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and
Hanbali in the Sunni madhab, and Athna-Ashariya, Ismailia, and Zaidya in
the Shia sect. An additional challenge in non-Muslim jurisdictions where the
student population taking Islamic Law has no prior knowledge of or exposure
to Arabic or Islam, is the need for a glossary of terms with English translation.
I adopt the practice of writing every new Arabic word used in class on the
board, reading it aloud and asking the class to repeat after me. One member
of the class volunteers to make notes to develop our own little Arabic/English
class dictionary which we revise before every class. It is inspiring to hear
enthusiastic attempts at reading words in a foreign language reverberating in
an otherwise all-English environment.
Any course on Islamic law must present a comprehensive history of the
primary and secondary sources of what constitutes Islamic law as well as juristic
techniques employed in the classical period of its evolution. Introducing
students to traditional methodology of usul-ul-fiqh need not be done to the
exclusion of illustrative examples of diverse interpretations of the same source.
One of the initial class assignments could be as follows: How do we use the
Family Law, available at http://www.ukcle.ac.uk/resources/teaching-and-learning-strategies/
islamiclaw/.
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Qur’an as a source on which to construct a law of evidence? After compiling
relevant Qur’anic verses on the subject, the student takes into consideration the
historical and cultural context of the verse and tries to determine the factors
leading to a certain law on the subject. Further, it is important for the student
to understand the principles of naskh, or abrogation, and its impact on lawmaking. The Qur’an was revealed over a period of almost twenty-three years
and on more than one occasion, a later verse abrogated an earlier verse where
a different law/regulation/injunction or exhortation was made. It is important
to bear this in mind when developing a law based on a verse(s) of the Qur’an.
Last, but not least, the student should engage the various interpretations of
a particular set of verses by different schools of juristic thought as well as
scholars belonging to Shia and Sunni sects.
Examples of divergent rules of law may be introduced early on in the course
as well as through small group seminars and class assignments. For instance,
Sunni schools of thought consider the triple talaq (divorce pronouncement)
as reprehensible yet legally valid as opposed to the Shia sect that considers it
non-binding and invalid.46 What is the basis for arriving at such diametrically
opposed conclusions, and how is this divergence explained in Islamic legal
methodology?47 Below are examples of possible case studies in an Islamic law
course.
Islamic Criminal Justice: Case Study 1
We might begin by sharing the genesis of Islamic criminal law on extramarital
sexual relationships (zina), its definition, evidentiary rule, and punishment.
Students are asked to follow all the relevant verses in the Qur’an and construct
a legally enforceable rule and compare it with existing legislation in some
Muslim countries. The Qur’an punishes extramarital sexual relations along a
spectrum, from declaring such behavior a moral and legal transgression and
punishable as tazir to making it a hadd offense triggering harsh mandatory
punishments.48 Verse 17:32 of the Qur’an prescribes thus: “And do not go near
46.
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fornication (zina) as it is immoral and an evil way.” No particular punishment
was prescribed at this stage.
Chapter 4 of the Qur’an entitled An-Nisa (Women) declares that, “If any
of your women Are guilty of lewdness, Take the evidence of four (Reliable)
witnesses from among you Against them; and if they testify, Confine them to
houses until Death do claim them, Or Allah ordain them Some (other) way.”49
The students may read the above verses as applicable to zina where the
prescribed punishment is imprisonment. This verse may also be termed as
a precursor to the stricter hadd punishment.50 But, as in other Quran’ic verses,
there is space for atonement and forgiveness.
Chapter 24 of the Qur’an goes on to create the hadd offence of zina and
prescribe punishment as follows:
The woman and the man Guilty of adultery or fornication, Flog each of them
With a hundred stripes; Let not compassion move you In their case, in a
matter Prescribed by Allah and the Last Day: And let a party Of the Believers
Witness their punishment.... Let no man guilty of Adultery or fornication
marry Any but a woman Similarly guilty, or an Unbeliever, Nor let any but
such a man Or an unbeliever Marry such a woman: To the Believers such a
thing Is forbidden.51

Here the students are likely to raise questions on how and why some
contemporary Muslim jurisdictions prescribe stoning to death as punishment
when none appears in the primary source, i.e., the Qur’an.
Finally, verses of the Qur’an relating to evidence may be incorporated into
the discussion as well as the linkage between qadfh and zina. Another step is
to link this case study with the hadd offence of qadfh or wrongful allegation
testimony implicating a person for zina.
In this regard, students note that the Qur’an states:
And those who launch A charge against chaste women, And produce not four
witnesses (To support their allegation), Flog them with eighty stripes; And
reject their evidence Ever after: for such men Are wicked transgressors; Unless
they repent thereafter And mend (their conduct): For Allah is Oft-Forgiving,
Most Merciful. Those who slander chaste, indiscreet but believing women,
are cursed in this life and in the hereafter: For them is grievous penalty. On
the Day when their tongues, their hands, and their feet will bear witness
against them as to their actions, on that day God will pay them back (all)
1993).
49.

Qur’an 4:15.

50.

However, Abdullah Yusaf Ali in his commentary of the Qur’an makes the point that verse 4:15
addresses homosexuality and not zina between a male and female.

51.

Qur’an 24:2–3.

224

Journal of Legal Education
their just dues, and they will realise that God is the (very) Truth, that makes
all things manifest.52

A contextual analysis of the Qur’anic text raises the question of what brought
about the harsh statement towards extramarital sexual activity and more so to
allegations and insinuations thereof? The above verses were revealed following
the famous “Affair of the Necklace” in which the Prophet Mohammad’s wife
Aisha was inadvertently left behind by a caravan in the desert as she went
searching for her necklace that had gone missing. She was spotted by one of
the young, single men in the Prophet’s entourage and brought back to Medina
leading to widespread rumours about her time alone with this man. The
subsequent weeks turned into a nightmare for Aisha as her honor and dignity
had come under question and she was suspected of inappropriate behaviour.
The verse, therefore, unambiguously silenced rumors against not only Aisha
but for future generations of women and proceeded to prescribe a very harsh
punishment for a person or persons who attempt to slander a woman’s good
name.53
Read together and in light of the verses’ context, it is evident that the
focus of the pronouncements was to safeguard women’s reputation and not
spread rumors regarding extramarital relationships. In fact, the Qur’an advises
people to walk away from a place where rumor mongering or impropriety (of
behavior) is rife.54
A contextual reading of the primary sources of Islamic law thus provides
a base upon which to build student skills for later parts of the course when
we discuss legal reform in the Muslim world.55 The case study also offers an
opportunity to challenge the entire situation (offense and punishment) in the
context of contemporary international human rights law.
52.
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Gender-Sensitive Islamic Law Curriculum: Case Study 2
Women are and always have been at the center of the discourse in Islamic
legal scholarship. This is true both within Muslim communities as well
as in the non-Muslim world. I agree with Kecia Ali who states that Islamic
law is a valuable resource to teach about women and gender in Islam.56 For
both detractors and proponents of Islam/Muslims, Islamic law becomes the
barometer on which gender equality is measured. Again, the major challenge
here is to differentiate between sources of Islamic law, in particular its primary
sources, on the one hand, and the Islamic legal tradition on the other. Both
are perceived as static and uniform, belying the dynamism and variation
inherent in Islamic law. This flawed perception legitimates unequal gender
relations and the inherent superiority of men. Thus, some Qur’anic verses are
cited as markers of this inequality and generalized as an integral component of
Islamic law. Examples include the evidentiary value of a woman’s testimony,
polygamy, physical chastisement of a wife by her husband, unilateral right of
a Muslim husband to divorce his wife, and so on.
A gender sensitive approach to Islamic law challenges this worldview,
arguing that the text on which discriminatory laws are based is open to
more than one interpretation. Thus in discussing the verses of the Qur’an on
polygamy, we attempt to adopt a holistic approach by also placing on the table
as it were, the provisos that would require incorporation into any law allowing
polygamy. Students are asked to consider the text on polygamy addressing the
following questions:
• Is polygamy a mandatory religious obligation for a Muslim male?
• Is polygamy the rule or the exception in the Qur’an?
• If it is the exception, what are the precedent conditions to a polygamous
marriage?
• How might these conditions form part of a law in the contemporary
sense of the term?
• What if any or all of the conditions are not followed? What is the status
of such a marriage: Is it valid, void or voidable?
Raising these issues opens up possibilities for legal debate and legislation
more sensitive to women and challenges the oft-repeated views that the Qur’an
accords a free hand to men for multiple marriages.
A further example of a gender sensitive approach to teaching Islamic law
consists of expanding the discursive terrain of what constitutes law-making
in the Islamic legal tradition. With the help of concrete examples, one can
highlight the sterility of maintaining an inflexible attitude to the process of
56.
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law making in Muslim jurisdictions as well as its application to Muslims in
non-Muslim jurisdictions. In my teaching, I attempt to take students through
a journey from Shari’a as principles of the Islamic legal tradition to siyasa Shari’a,
or legislative enactments by the political authority of the state, and onwards
to qanun or enforceable law, pointing out at various stages the distance from
the divine and consequently the proximity of human intervention in the
domain of law making. Law making is a human effort at interpreting and
understanding the divine text and must be distinguished from the text, and
subsequent generations of Muslim communities ought not to be held hostage
to these time bound articulations.
There are many examples of that flexibility, most prominently those
interpretations impacting women’s rights.57 Verse 2.282 of the Qur’an provides
an example where pronouncements of arguably restricted application are used
as justification for creating gender hierarchies within the Islamic tradition. We
refer to the laws of evidence as an example where students are able to debate
the contextual setting of the Qur’anic verses, relevant hadith on the subject,
and its potential legislative formulations in contemporary times. A number
of Muslim jurisdictions including Pakistan have legislated on the basis of
Verse 2.282, thus legally reducing the status of women.58 The verse states
that the testimony of a woman is worth half that of a man in written financial
transactions:
And get two witnesses,
Out of your own men,
And if there are not two men,
Then a man and two women,
Such as ye choose,
For witnesses,
So that if one of them errs,
The other can remind her.

57.
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Students are required to read views, opinions, and commentaries of scholars
on the subject. Fazlur Rahman, for instance, believes that this verse is not
stating any general law of the evidentiary value of male and female statements:
If the Qur’an did really regard a woman’s evidence as half that of a man’s, why
should it not allow the evidence of four females to be equivalent to that of
two males and why should it say that only one of the males may be replaced
by two females? The intention of the Qur’an apparently was that since it is a
question of financial transaction and since women usually do not deal with
such matters or with business affairs in general, it would be better to have two
women rather than one—if one had to have women—and that, if possible at all,
one must have at least one male.59

Fazlur Rahman then goes on to state that one cannot simply deduce from
Verse 2:282 a general law that under all circumstances and for all purposes, a
woman’s evidence is inferior to a man’s. He is convinced that this verse does
not at all prove any rational deficiency in women vis-à-vis men. As an example,
he cites classical Islamic law which regards women with knowledge of
gynecology as the most competent witnesses in cases involving gynecological
issues.60 Finally, he also suggests that even if a law could be formulated on
the basis of such generalizations there is compelling reason to change the law
when social circumstances change, such as when women and men are equally
educated and conversant with business and financial transactions.61
Rahman’s is a minority view and students often find it hard to find similar
gender sensitive interpretations, posing a formidable challenge to developing
a balanced Islamic law curriculum.
Language/Competence of Non-Arabic Speaking Instructors
To what extent is English language scholarship adequately representative
of the richness of the Islamic legal tradition? The answer is complex. Barring
some honorable exceptions, the English-language scholarship is doctrinal
and one discerns elements of what Said describes as Orientalism among some
European writers on the subject. The well-known works of Ignaz Goldziher,
Joseph Schacht, and others relating to Hadith as a source of Islamic law are
examples of this trend that have only lately seen robust challenge.62 Until
recently, there were few non-western Islamic law scholars writing in English,
so students drawing upon English language scholarship were mostly unaware
of different aspects and perspectives to this debate.
Is a non-Muslim competent to teach Islamic law? I had not given this much
thought until a couple of years ago when a colleague asked the question. I
59.
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responded that Islamic law is part of legal scholarship and so long as the tutor
is competent to teach the subject, the question of religious belief ought not
to apply. Is knowledge of Arabic an essential pre-requisite for teaching and
learning Islamic law due to the fact that the Qur’an, Hadith, and most of the
legal scholarship is in Arabic? The answer is complex and inclusive. Ideally,
the primary sources ought to be read and understood in the original language,
yet following the spread of Islam, non-Arab Muslims (except for the few who
learned the language) relied on translations of the Qur’an and Ahadith. This
automatically produced various understandings of the more complex aspects
of the law. Although not explicitly stated, an on-going debate exists among
scholars and the laity as to whether a hierarchy of knowledge had been created
by virtue of the language in which it is generated. Some Islamic law scholars
believe that the highest form of knowledge is generated by Arabic speaking
scholars and a lower one by those who access it through translations. Thus,
some Arab speaking Muslim scholars applauded the contemporariness of
the Qur’an and Arabic “…because the categories of grammar, lexicography,
syntax and redaction of the Qur’anic text, and those of Arabic consciousness
embedded in the Arabic language have not changed through the centuries.
This phenomenon is indeed unique….”63
Others, including An-Naim, remind us that “The Qur’an was revealed in
Arabic, which is a human language that evolved in its own specific historical
context, and many verses of the Qur’an were addressing specific situations
in the daily lives of early Muslims at that time (610–632 CE) in their local
context of western Arabia.”64 This suggests that knowledge of Arabic does not
necessarily imply superior understanding of the Qur’anic text.
While the primacy of Arabic in Islamic law scholarship can be debated, it
is evident that understanding the Qur’an and Hadith from the Arabic text or
through translations by a diverse community of Muslims around the world has
implications for the teaching and learning of Islamic law in English speaking
and non-Arab Muslim jurisdictions. Teaching Islamic law from translated
material means that one must, in the interest of objectivity, include a range
of translations. Which one is more faithful to the original text and how does
one construct an argument for a particular rule of law based on the Qur’an
and Hadith? I would argue however that, even if one were teaching from the
original Arabic text, that too would be susceptible to more than one meaning.
After all, English (or French or German) legal texts may similarly be debated
and different variants of interpretations derived.
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Challenges and Issues and the Way Forward
The restrictive approach towards Islamic law due to its source in divine
texts spills over into the teaching of Islamic law in non-Muslim jurisdictions
but from a different perspective. Popular understandings of Islam and Islamic
law as doctrinal, fossilized, and backward looking tend to be the prism
through which Islamic legal scholarship in English is read, understood and
contextualized. A number of responses may help dispel these notions. For
instance, an Islamic Law course is not like western courses in contracts, trusts
or banking law and so on, because Islamic law is not statute law and thus has
no single definitive content. Teaching Islamic law thus means teaching a range
of possible rules on a particular topic based on the interpretation of those
rules employed to resolve problems arising in various spheres of life. Although
in recent years, codification of some areas of Islamic law has occurred, the
vast corpus of Islamic law continues to be taught and applied as “principles
of law” rather than “the law.” The method Muslim jurisdictions use to apply
Islamic law principles, rather than statutes, and the mechanism by which a
jurist arrives at a particular understanding of law, needs wider publication.
Students also need exposure to a broader Islamic law curriculum. I have
often worried about the exclusion of Islamic court procedures and experiences
in the curriculum, but some scholars have begun to fill this gap including
Tucker’s65 meticulous collection of qadi courts during the Ottoman period,
Moors’s66 and Welchman’s67 work on women and property rights in Palestine,
and Shahram’s68 and Sonbol’s69 work on family courts in the Middle East.
These records show Islamic law in action and are fascinating examples of how
women in particular articulated and obtained their rights through courts by
using Islamic law.
A further initiative might be to obtain and translate, from both Muslim and
non-Muslim countries, actual examples of marriage contracts with stipulations
made by women, be it for dower amounts, place of residence after marriage,
restricting the husband’s power to pronounce talaq, and so on. I believe this
primary source documentation of Islamic law in action would breathe life into
a mundane reading of requirements of a valid marriage contract.
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English language scholarship is increasing at a commendable pace, yet far
more work is required to enhance existing offerings. More importantly, broader
use of translated materials from various languages would better represent the
diversity of the Islamic legal tradition.
Another challenge is to develop high quality teaching and learning
resources in a range of Islamic law modules, not simply those confined to
Muslim family law. Most institutions limit themselves to a family law course
where there is abundant literature, and this passes as Islamic law in toto. The
United Kingdom Council of Legal Education (UKCLE), the University of
Warwick,70 and the Commonwealth Legal Education Association through
an Islamic Law Curriculum Development Project have developed a number
of teaching manuals as well as a glossary of Arabic/English words and a
bibliography. This is work in progress and we hope to expand and enrich these
resources to encourage and support teachers of Islamic law globally.
There is an unmet need for a degree in Islamic law, as distinguished from
Islamic studies, in western institutions of higher education. For instance, major
financial institutions in a number of non-Muslim countries are now training
their staff to do business with oil-producing Muslim jurisdictions, generating
significant new interest in Islamic finance and banking law. As a consequence,
related areas of Islamic law including family law, human rights, Zakat, social
welfare law, criminal justice, and Islamic international law, to name a few,
are also in significant demand in the west. In the present global political and
social climate, where discomfort and distrust of Islam and Muslims is at an
alarmingly high level, including Islamic law in the list of law school offerings
would present an opportunity to engage firsthand with the Islamic legal
tradition. For most law students in western universities, this would likely be
their first and perhaps only interaction with Islamic law, or indeed Islam and
Muslims, and a chance to dispel pre-conceived notions. I see this happening
every time I walk into my Islamic law class. Islamic legal scholarship as a
rigorous discipline may yet be the bridge where the “twain may meet” after all!
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